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15.10.2026

Knives, a Ledger and 44 Seconds: Tracing $760,000 Stolen in a UK Home Invasion

In the early hours of October 13, a crypto investor known as Realist posted on X that attackers had broken into his home, tied him up, threatened him with a knife and forced him to transfer roughly $800,000. He shared the Solana address that received the funds. BitOK analysts traced it using the Graph tool and reconstructed where the money went. Here is the full sequence of events.


Contents:


  • What Happened: The Victim's Account

  • Details of the Attack

  • Where the Money Went: Key Findings

  • Timeline: How the Funds Moved On-Chain

What Happened: The Victim's Account

Realist's first post appeared on October 13 at 01:09:28 UTC. He said he had been attacked in his home in the United Kingdom, tied up, threatened with a knife and robbed of approximately $800,000. He also published the address B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR, to which he said he was forced to send the funds.

Seventeen minutes later, at 01:26:10 UTC, he clarified that around $40,000 had been taken from his regular wallets and another $720,000 from a single Ledger hardware wallet. Later, he said police were at the scene.

Details of the Attack

According to the trader, the intruders held three knives to his face and threatened to kill him. They bound him with tape and forced him to unlock his wallets, including his Ledger. The hardware device keeps private keys offline, which can protect against hackers, but not against people wielding knives. The robbers also took a Rolex watch and smashed his phone. Realist escaped with bruises and urged crypto investors in the UK to leave the country.

Solscan flagged the published wallet address as suspicious, displaying a warning that it was linked to the robbery.

Crypto commentator Bala described it as a type of attack the industry rarely discusses. In his view, the central question is how the criminals knew about the victim's holdings and where to find him.

Bala suggested that a leak of Revolut customer data could have led the attackers to the victim. The victim confirmed that he banks with the neobank. There is no official confirmation of any connection between the leak and the attack.

Where the Money Went: Key Findings

The address published by the victim received 346.13 SOL and 718,735.80 USDC, worth approximately $760,000 in total. From there, the funds took two separate routes.

The stablecoins went to an exchange. Roughly two hours after the post, all 718,735 USDC reached a wallet labeled HitBTC, where they merged into the exchange's pooled balance. Public blockchain data cannot reveal who controlled the credited account or what happened to the funds afterward. Only the exchange has that information.

The SOL was swapped for ETH, most of which remains untouched. A total of 346 SOL was exchanged for 14.7 ETH via the cross-chain service NEAR Intents in just 44 seconds. Of that amount, 13.73 ETH (93%) is still held across three Ethereum addresses and has not moved since October 14. Another 0.97 ETH was sent in three payments to an address labeled Aeroswap.

A second trail emerged that the victim never mentioned. From the same intermediary address that forwarded USDC to the robbers' wallet, another 1,725 USDC was exchanged for around 0.7 ETH. Some of those funds reached an address labeled RedotPay. The link between this trail and the robbery has not been established.

The transaction history was deliberately polluted. Five lookalike Solana addresses appeared along the route, alongside tiny transfers and spoofed Ethereum token events that impersonated senders. We filtered out all of this noise and excluded it from the totals.

What the blockchain cannot tell us. It does not identify the attackers, the owner of the exchange account or the ultimate recipients of payments routed through Aeroswap and RedotPay. Answering those questions requires records from the services involved and confirmation from the victim about each originating wallet.

What follows is the complete trail: every transaction, every address and every amount, down to the last wei.
BitOK conducted this investigation using its Graph tool.

Timeline: How the Funds Moved On-Chain

The funds began moving on the evening of October 12 UTC, several hours before the victim's first post.

Step 1. Evening of October 12: Funds arrive at the robbers' address. At 22:38, 346 SOL arrived at B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR (B3p for short). Seven minutes later, wallet Bj7sy sent 720,464 USDC to intermediary address 7jy. Another 13 minutes later, at 22:58, that intermediary sent 718,735 USDC to B3p. B3p now held approximately $760,000, matching the amount the victim would later report.

Step 2. That same night: A separate branch. The intermediary address 7jy retained 1,728 USDC in remaining funds. Between 23:24 and 23:27, these were sent to address 8gt. From there, 1,725 USDC went to a swap service and were converted into 0.6986 ETH in 44 seconds. The victim did not mention these funds, and it is not yet possible to establish that they came from the same theft.

Step 3. October 13, 01:09: The victim goes public. His first post appeared. Ten minutes later, at 01:19 and 01:20, SOL moved from B3p to intermediary DWMD in two transfers. By 01:24, the funds had reached a NEAR Intents swap deposit; 44 seconds later, 14.7 ETH appeared at Ethereum address 0xf672. At 01:26, the victim broke down the loss: $40,000 from regular wallets and $720,000 from his Ledger.

Step 4. 01:41–02:16: The stablecoins reach an exchange. B3p sent 718,735 USDC to an address labeled HitBTC Dep. Thirty-five minutes later, those funds were swept into the exchange's hot wallet. The publicly traceable USDC trail ends there.

Step 5. 03:52: ETH moves into storage. Almost all 14.7 ETH moved from the payout address to the main wallet, 0xeec3, which would become the attackers' apparent vault.

Step 6. October 13, daytime: The funds are split. Between 14:55 and 16:12 UTC, the main wallet distributed 0.94 ETH and 0.54 ETH to two holding wallets, along with two further payments through chains of single-use intermediaries to an address labeled Aeroswap.

Step 7. Evening of October 14: The final movement. At 22:42, a third payment of 0.0355 ETH reached Aeroswap. No further movement was observed after that. We checked the remaining balances on October 15.

Date and time (UTC)

Event

Amount

12 Oct 22:38:19

SOL received from G9VPG at B3p (S01)

346.128159507 SOL

12 Oct 22:45:11

USDC sent from Bj7sy to intermediary 7jy (S02)

720,464.254644 USDC

12 Oct 22:58:50

USDC received from 7jy at B3p (S03)

718,735.798692 USDC

12 Oct 23:24:47

Remaining funds sent from 7jy to 8gt (S04)

1,720.192395 USDC

12 Oct 23:25:09

Remaining funds sent from 7jy to 8gt (S05)

6.605961 USDC

12 Oct 23:26:51

From 8gt to swap deposit 7Sxc (S06)

1,725 USDC

12 Oct 23:27:35

NEAR Intents payout to 0xc099 (E01)

0.698582915063641659 ETH

13 Oct 01:09:28

Victim's first X post

—

13 Oct 01:19:07

From B3p to intermediary DWMD (S07)

20 SOL

13 Oct 01:20:28

From B3p to intermediary DWMD (S08)

326.126662056 SOL

13 Oct 01:24:15

From DWMD to swap deposit vj83 (S09)

346.125169610 SOL

13 Oct 01:24:59

NEAR Intents payout to 0xf672 (E02)

14.700024849433303243 ETH

13 Oct 01:26:10

Victim clarifies: $40,000 + $720,000

—

13 Oct 01:41:08

From B3p to DN2c, labeled HitBTC Dep (S10)

718,735 USDC

13 Oct 02:16:10

From DN2c to BfP2, labeled HitBTC Hot Wallet 1 (S11)

718,735 USDC

13 Oct 03:52:11

From 0xf672 to main wallet 0xeec3 (E03)

14.69997657 ETH

13 Oct 14:55:59

From 0xeec3 to first holding wallet 0xa80f (E04)

0.9382916 ETH

13 Oct 15:26:11

From 0xeec3 to second holding wallet 0x13b2 (E05)

0.536467895376838892 ETH

13 Oct 15:54:59–16:01:23

First payment to Aeroswap via 0x2f25 and 0x28c7 (E06–E08)

0.19940474378446023 ETH

13 Oct 16:08:11–16:12:47

Second payment to Aeroswap via 0x2f25 and 0x123b (E09–E11)

0.730486058801652989 ETH

13 Oct 17:17:35

Unrelated spoofed-sender transaction (E12)

0 ETH

14 Oct 00:52:59

From 0xabee to address labeled RedotPay (E13)

0.031822457352032674 ETH

14 Oct 22:39:59–22:42:47

Third payment to Aeroswap via 0x2f25 and 0x1ba8 (E14–E16)

0.035538672221488689 ETH

15 Oct

Balance snapshots taken across networks

—

Below, we examine each link in the chain. References S01–S11 and E01–E16 correspond to the table of verified transactions at the end of this article.

The USDC Trail Before the Robbery Address

The stablecoins did not reach B3p directly. On October 12 at 22:45:11 UTC, address Bj7syMSdLhR2WfVCwJtgYcqWghc5cHD9dnmu7ZsT9ica transferred 720,464.254644 USDC to the token account associated with 7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C. Evidence: S02.

At 22:58:50 UTC, that second address sent 718,735.798692 USDC to the published recipient, B3p. The same transaction also sent 0.240900 USDC to account 5JV6dqNV5qjaXcSFmvJoHbfzLdMqv3WyudVJSRhqSCEp, whose on-chain owner is 3YzxGgCjQUx1b38Xq4jkbnM6Fk7HvhKt3yg2eijKLbRt. The purpose of this small accompanying payment is unknown. Evidence: S03.

Publicly available evidence does not establish whether Bj7sy and 7jy belonged to the victim or to someone else. This is the investigation's first fork: if Bj7sy was the victim's wallet, 7jy was either another address under his control or an address already controlled by the attackers.

The Main USDC Outflow: The Route to HitBTC

On October 13 at 01:41:08 UTC, B3p transferred 718,735 USDC to DN2cCPNJnHjUxHwmNvfcKbhvcQnNQwvimugZLwDKMt2J. Evidence: S10. At 02:16:10 UTC, the same 718,735 USDC moved to BfP2dBiHbiqYvsmESsgHEL8wQtZt25sbDNKnwmNRB34G. Evidence: S11.

DN2c was supplied with the label HitBTC Dep, while BfP2 was labeled HitBTC: Hot Wallet 1. The transfers between these exact addresses are confirmed on-chain. The labels themselves, however, could not be independently reconfirmed at the time of collection because access to Solscan was restricted. HitBTC therefore remains a supplied service attribution rather than a newly verified one.

The deposit was swept up in a single batched transaction alongside four other incoming transfers. The amount relevant to this case was 718,735 USDC, while the pooled USDC account increased by 741,403.939201 USDC in total during that transaction. The other deposits are not attributed to this case. After the sweep, the pooled wallet held 827,465.347841 USDC: the exchange wallet's combined balance, not the proceeds of this one incident.

This is where the public trail ends. Tracing the funds further would require the service's records of the specific deposit credit, the customer's account and subsequent instructions involving the internal balance. Outflows from the pooled wallet cannot be attributed to this customer merely because the amounts or timing look similar.

SOL: 44 Seconds to Ethereum

The first recorded incoming transfer to B3p was 346.128159507 SOL, sent on October 12 at 22:38:19 UTC by G9VPG4XvHheUUbzPexNzx9Yyx97ii53WYb89PvdM2qQk. Evidence: S01. The full prior history of sender G9 is unavailable: only one page containing 100 signatures was preserved.

Almost three hours later, the SOL began moving again. Two transfers reached intermediary address DWMDdqJUy9ywU3MVRcpZjehqfpSyTV6o3r9Rf2UQoXwf on October 13: 20 SOL at 01:19:07 UTC and 326.126662056 SOL at 01:20:28 UTC. Then, at 01:24:15 UTC, 346.125169610 SOL was sent to swap deposit address vj83ppgFCvR1MJbopKzkJqZ7PFanmAEpE2aFVPVdQaH. Deposit: S09.

NEAR Intents then executed the cross-chain swap, with SwapKit as the solver. The original order record shows a SUCCESS status, a Solana deposit, an Ethereum payout, the full recipient address and the exact amounts. The deposit and payout were independently verified on their respective blockchains.

Field

Value

Order created (UTC)

2026-10-13 01:24:06.837021

Deposit (UTC)

2026-10-13 01:24:15

Payout (UTC)

2026-10-13 01:24:59

Elapsed time

44 seconds

Payout

14.700024849433303243 ETH

Recipient

0xf672434c9a5c67f4394b3a94842fb86102dd1926

Intent hash

GaYzDbARTLv8sWMU4p9e69ydNkHUXkgdJ5jDR5fyWDc6

Payout: E02. The ETH was sent from the service's shared Ethereum payout address, 0x2cff890f0378a11913b6129b2e97417a2c302680.

Swap Fees and Deposit Processing

The order record lists fees of 1.038375508 SOL payable to hvlnear.near and 0.346125169 SOL payable to swapkit.near. These are fields reported by the service; they are not subtracted again from the amount of ETH actually received. Network fees are accounted for separately.

The Solana deposit was processed eight seconds later: 346.125265394 SOL, including 0.000095784 SOL added by the processing address, was sent to 6tckHFBpiJ8YgYN8FUskvtvTpXQZ55g5LHeo1kvELoDQ. Address 9WL2A89YBr6X47ABKYNzPentWiBA3H8tpaiuf5CaYHx6 handled the processing of swap deposits. Shared service infrastructure downstream of the deposit is not classified as an attacker-controlled wallet.

How the ETH Was Distributed and Sent to Aeroswap

At 03:52:11 UTC on October 13, the initial recipient, 0xf672434c9a5c67f4394b3a94842fb86102dd1926, transferred 14.69997657 ETH to 0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f, the primary holding and distribution wallet. Evidence: E03.

Later that day, the main address allocated 0.9382916 ETH to the first holding wallet, 0xa80fd27f9946e6235e21e8f0cdf9592624865246 (14:55:59 UTC, E04), and 0.536467895376838892 ETH to the second holding wallet, 0x13b2809c6b3ad71024f624eabf857b59113462e3 (15:26:11 UTC, E05).

Three other transfers followed the same pattern: from the main wallet to distribution address 0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e, then to a single-use intermediary, and finally to 0xfb19ffd1ff9316b7f5bba076ef4b78e4bbedf4e1. An independently retrieved AML attribution identifies this exact recipient address as Aeroswap. The intermediaries were 0x28c741448db4429ca214b3e39a3b61f262b74d1c, 0x123b8f9781529ad3d173171a05937b263f9bebfc and 0x1ba8c07afcc14856099186685724b218969d78f2. Each was used exactly once.

UTC

ETH

TXID

2026-10-13T16:01:23Z

0.19940474378446023

E08

2026-10-13T16:12:47Z

0.730486058801652989

E11

2026-10-14T22:42:47Z

0.035538672221488689

E16

Combined total: 0.965429474807601908 ETH. The third payment took place on October 14 at 22:42:47 UTC and was the last recorded movement of funds. A service label does not identify the individual whose account received credit for the payments. Beyond the service's pooled wallet, public records cannot establish ownership of the funds. Full identifiers for the verified transactions appear in the appendix; dust deposits are accounted for separately.

Main-Branch Balances: Reconciled to the Wei

As of October 15, 2026, the balances were as follows:

Full Ethereum address

ETH

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

12.259637912895909298

0xa80fd27f9946e6235e21e8f0cdf9592624865246

0.9382916

0x13b2809c6b3ad71024f624eabf857b59113462e3

0.536467895376838892

0xf672434c9a5c67f4394b3a94842fb86102dd1926

0.000004979010005243

The first three addresses held 13.734397408272748190 ETH. Including the initial swap recipient and residual wei at the other intermediaries, the eight verified addresses in the main branch held 13.734402387282772335 ETH. The separate USDC branch is not included in these figures.

The main branch balances reconcile exactly:

14.700024849433303243 ETH paid out + 0.000000004 ETH in external dust = 13.734402387282772335 ETH remaining + 0.965429474807601908 ETH paid to Aeroswap + 0.000192991342929 ETH in network fees.

Put simply, 93% of the 14.7 ETH obtained in exchange for SOL had not moved. That is unusual for extortionists, who generally rush to launder their proceeds. For police, it presents an opportunity.

Almost nothing remains on Solana. B3p held 0.561732 USDC and 0.001508440 SOL, while DWMD held 0.001498441 SOL. B3p's USDC balance includes an unrelated dust transfer of 0.000100 USDC. These small residual balances should not all be treated as unspent portions of the original transfer.

The Second Branch: The 1,725 USDC Nobody Mentioned

After sending 718,735.798692 USDC to B3p, the intermediary address 7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C had 1,728.215052 USDC remaining. At 23:24:47 and 23:25:09 UTC on October 12, it sent 1,720.192395 USDC (S04) and 6.605961 USDC (S05), respectively, to 8gt7trRySj1Gzt3HtcsNVDe5UkT7BBPjQjHY62k371Qg.

At 23:26:51 UTC, that recipient forwarded 1,725 USDC to swap deposit address 7SxcLM1Ep56arSKTcB3CzHLtjyf51QgDua8cG8MwVmux. Deposit: S06. Address FvULawNPGBbuwYus74ECaQoV1oH9Tk6XPN7VPN51NYds swept the USDC from this swap deposit.

A second original NEAR Intents order record links the deposit to a payout of 0.698582915063641659 ETH at 23:27:35 UTC to 0xc09925a2ccfb801b45133d129d49a51e3b3c7548. The elapsed time was again 44 seconds. Payout: E01, again from the shared payout address 0x2cff890f0378a11913b6129b2e97417a2c302680. Intent hash: HL25uag7XgDfnrPkqwbxuaojfcfDVntG4zdLozPxVss8. The service lists fees of 5.175000 USDC and 1.725000 USDC payable to hvlnear.near and swapkit.near, respectively.

This branch connects to the main route through their shared upstream USDC address. However, neither the attackers' control over these funds nor their inclusion in the reported loss has been established.

Balances and the Limits of Attribution

The additional branch originates from the same intermediate USDC address that sent the main payment to B3p. To establish that it formed part of the theft, investigators would need to determine who controlled 7jy, 8gt and the ETH recipient, as well as precisely which transactions the victim signed under duress. A matching swap route and the service's shared payout address are not enough: NEAR Intents processes thousands of unrelated orders.

The remaining balances were 0.000000630547008 ETH at 0xc099, 0.001790471879995659 ETH at 0xcb802 and 0.094736432177307 ETH at 0x390f. The entire balances of older wallets containing commingled funds are not attributed to the case. Address 7jy retained 1.175166 USDC and 8gt retained 1.559126 USDC; neither amount is added to the main branch's retained funds.

Where the Additional ETH Payout Went

At 23:29:23 UTC, recipient 0xc099 transferred 0.698538185063641659 ETH to distribution address 0xcb8027c2c36239d0fb15ee2f8995b097ed79f1a1. From there, the funds split in three directions:
  • 0.54361855 ETH went to 0x390f90dd7fe8665059869655cf757b9d52a7f1ac.
  • 0.13590463 ETH went to 0x41902261f16299c698b9e27a1569bfd27cf7d29b, an address with prior activity and other funds. Its subsequent transfer of 0.136892175210883442 ETH to 0x5b8d2b4acbc8021f38f63ae67b6dd24b4dfca066 formed part of a commingled flow; the entire amount is not attributed to this case.
  • Two smaller transfers totaling 0.01702936 ETH went to 0x03547e71b1cd80b30e1c481913063d23386cbe45. That address then sent 0.017021065081774 ETH to high-volume infrastructure address 0x480cd46e6fade651a0437deadda53d5c8e7d846a. Within the one-hour window examined, the latter had 91 standard transactions; the subsequent route of the specific funds could not be established.

Commingled Funds and the RedotPay Connection

Address 0x390f made three further distributions:
  • 0.39606671 ETH to 0x56af94348f478cb6f8ed2c75273253547b32acd2. That wallet also received 0.14920665 ETH from another address before sending 0.54522716 ETH to 0xaf5ee32415cac2a5b611eb60169fa74a9e2e201c. This was a combined outflow, and the share attributable to the original branch could not be traced further.
  • 0.02625676 ETH to 0xf1da42e4f7a3b7fd35ae541a9338577281d68b41.
  • 0.02641072 ETH to 0xabee62571252c285a803987b3bdaa7b85fadc349. Thirty-nine minutes later, that address sent 0.031822457352032674 ETH to 0x9d7d8b567ee10bcb4f9db438245e1d0668175d72, which carries an attribution to RedotPay, a crypto payment card service. The outgoing transfer exceeded the incoming amount from the branch under review. The label applies to this exact recipient address; the entire outgoing amount is not attributed to the case.
Verified RedotPay transaction: E13, October 14 at 00:52:59 UTC.

Unrelated Transfers and a Fabricated Transaction History

The route was surrounded by noise, some of it deliberate. On Solana, five addresses were identified that imitate the beginnings and endings of legitimate counterparties: 7jyoZ5AmWYX2iapiCNvWadB5kVRPm8gzMc7TLuuBpf6C, B3pMsPwT1rjR8cSvR7dVhYP9VkE2Titvb9cSQK5G4rCR, DWMDaB7cZp5YKWsV9rnBePuSVkBdP5RepPPvJenJbXwf, DWMDeAz9KuaLs3AcdJpaZBx74zVWk1gwZoJN82Ym2Xwf and vj83NEABwPc5gv6zFrQLBMCLprLCdZfgo329ESizcaH. They sent tiny amounts, including 0.000100 USDC, 0.000010 USDC and minute fractions of SOL. Numerous one-lamport transfers were also present. The parties involved in these transfers were not grouped with the suspected attackers.
On Ethereum, two distinct kinds of transaction-history pollution were observed:
  1. Four ordinary external dust transfers of 1 gwei of ETH each to addresses on the main route. They are accounted for separately in the balance reconciliation: the 0.000000004 ETH of "external dust" noted above.
  2. Events emitted by unrelated ERC-20 contracts with names resembling ETH. The sender field impersonates a wallet under investigation, while the recipient looks similar to a legitimate address. These events are not transfers of native ETH, nor do they establish that the owner of the address named in the event signed anything.
For example, in E12 (October 13 at 17:17:35 UTC), a token event names the main wallet, 0xeec3, as sender and 0x77eb52e44db06777bce478159f25c0d55a295314 as recipient. But the actual transaction sender is 0x1584a8ee67789d1fe161065388657ad2f2a3c7dd, the native value of the transaction is zero, and the transaction is directed to a different contract. Both the transaction and its receipt were preserved; this event is excluded from the funds flow.

The token events were recorded along with their contract addresses and classified separately. Their amounts are not added to the total ETH moved out. For two examples, the actual transaction sender was independently retrieved. Other suspicious events were classified using the known contract address and event structure; the code of every such token contract was not comprehensively reviewed.

Limits of the Findings and Next Steps

Service accounts. To follow the main USDC branch, investigators need deposit-credit records and direct confirmation of the addresses' service attribution. For the three transfers to the address labeled Aeroswap, they need records identifying the credited customer. No inquiries were sent to these organizations during this investigation.

Ownership of the originating addresses and the secondary branch. The victim would need to confirm each originating address and TXID, identify every transaction signed under duress and explain the remaining USDC. The additional 1,725 USDC and 0.69858 ETH are not presented as a confirmed part of the loss.

Tracing beyond commingled funds. Investigators have not identified the customer behind the pooled service wallets, the ultimate beneficiary of the transfer through RedotPay, the specific funds' route beyond infrastructure address 0x480c or the relevant share of the commingled outflow to 0xaf5e. Addresses and verified transfers have been retained for follow-up work.

How the attackers may have identified the victim. The theory that a Revolut customer-data leak led the attackers to the victim (discussed earlier in this article) is not corroborated by the evidence examined and is not treated as an established element of the attack.

Identity and common control. Public on-chain transfers establish how funds moved and what role an address played. They do not identify the attackers, prove that all intermediary wallets had the same owner or implicate the services in the robbery. The incoming label Fake_Phishing4516 is not a substitute for that attribution and likewise could not be independently refreshed through Solscan.

A Shared Transaction-Fee Payer

During the main outflow, B3p also sent 0.237060 USDC to token account 5JV6dqNV5qjaXcSFmvJoHbfzLdMqv3WyudVJSRhqSCEp. The SOL network fees for both of B3p's USDC transactions were paid by HdqFSBzMaWzfSuncnPHPj6PSy7F1JUSjrEZdjYSfG2sN; separate signers authorized the USDC transfers. A shared fee payer may serve multiple users, so it has not been included in the suspected attackers' cluster.

How We Verified the Funds Flow

The case files preserve 24 complete Solana transactions, standard Ethereum transfers, internal transfers and token events. The main Ethereum branch contains 13 value transfers and four dust deposits. Contextual transactions belonging to other service customers, and the addresses' older histories, are not attributed to the theft.

USDC on Solana was verified against token mint address EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v. A matching token name or ticker alone was not considered sufficient to identify the asset.

Balances on the main Ethereum branch were reconciled across eight addresses: incoming and outgoing amounts, including network fees, match the actual balances exactly. Execution receipts were retained for significant transfers. Both swap orders were matched to their Solana deposits and Ethereum payouts in exact base units.

Short transaction histories for the main Solana addresses and their USDC token accounts were reviewed separately. Sender G9's full history was unavailable: only one page of 100 signatures was preserved. For Bj7 and its USDC token account, collection covers the period under investigation and extends across its October 12 UTC lower boundary, but it is not presented as a complete historical record.

Balances were retrieved through separate queries on October 15, 2026, not through a single atomic snapshot of both networks. Details of internal NEAR operations came from the original swap records and were not independently rechecked on NEAR. The corresponding entry and exit transactions were separately verified on Solana and Ethereum.

What Can Be Reproduced

Full addresses, their observed roles and the identifiers of verified transactions appear below, with direct links to blockchain explorers. The tables provide UTC timestamps, assets, amounts and sender-to-recipient information for each recorded transfer. Original responses and checksums are preserved in the case folder: the reconstructed ledger REALIST_TRACE_REBUILT_2026-10-15.json, Solana and Ethereum transfer tables, Ethereum balances, coverage limits (coverage.json), the address register and token events.

Original swap records: SOL-to-ETH swap and USDC-to-ETH swap.

Address Register

The roles describe observed address behavior. Common ownership has not been established, and service labels do not identify individual customers.

Address

Network

Role

B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR

Solana

Recipient address published by the victim

DWMDdqJUy9ywU3MVRcpZjehqfpSyTV6o3r9Rf2UQoXwf

Solana

SOL intermediary

DN2cCPNJnHjUxHwmNvfcKbhvcQnNQwvimugZLwDKMt2J

Solana

USDC deposit; supplied label: HitBTC Dep

BfP2dBiHbiqYvsmESsgHEL8wQtZt25sbDNKnwmNRB34G

Solana

USDC consolidator; supplied label: HitBTC Hot Wallet 1

vj83ppgFCvR1MJbopKzkJqZ7PFanmAEpE2aFVPVdQaH

Solana

Deposit for the main SOL-to-ETH swap

G9VPG4XvHheUUbzPexNzx9Yyx97ii53WYb89PvdM2qQk

Solana

Sender of 346.128159507 SOL

Bj7syMSdLhR2WfVCwJtgYcqWghc5cHD9dnmu7ZsT9ica

Solana

Upstream sender of 720.464.254644 USDC

7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C

Solana

Intermediate USDC address before B3p

8gt7trRySj1Gzt3HtcsNVDe5UkT7BBPjQjHY62k371Qg

Solana

Recipient of remaining funds; sender of 1.725 USDC

7SxcLM1Ep56arSKTcB3CzHLtjyf51QgDua8cG8MwVmux

Solana

Deposit for the additional USDC-to-ETH swap

HdqFSBzMaWzfSuncnPHPj6PSy7F1JUSjrEZdjYSfG2sN

Solana

Network fee payer for two B3p USDC transactions

3YzxGgCjQUx1b38Xq4jkbnM6Fk7HvhKt3yg2eijKLbRt

Solana

Recipient of small associated USDC payments

5JV6dqNV5qjaXcSFmvJoHbfzLdMqv3WyudVJSRhqSCEp

Solana

Token account for accompanying payments of 0.240900 and 0.237060 USDC

9WL2A89YBr6X47ABKYNzPentWiBA3H8tpaiuf5CaYHx6

Solana

Swap deposit processing

6tckHFBpiJ8YgYN8FUskvtvTpXQZ55g5LHeo1kvELoDQ

Solana

SOL swept from swap deposit

FvULawNPGBbuwYus74ECaQoV1oH9Tk6XPN7VPN51NYds

Solana

USDC swept from additional swap deposit

7jyoZ5AmWYX2iapiCNvWadB5kVRPm8gzMc7TLuuBpf6C

Solana

Lookalike-address dust transfers

B3pMsPwT1rjR8cSvR7dVhYP9VkE2Titvb9cSQK5G4rCR

Solana

Lookalike-address dust transfers

DWMDaB7cZp5YKWsV9rnBePuSVkBdP5RepPPvJenJbXwf

Solana

Lookalike-address dust transfers

DWMDeAz9KuaLs3AcdJpaZBx74zVWk1gwZoJN82Ym2Xwf

Solana

Lookalike-address dust transfers

vj83NEABwPc5gv6zFrQLBMCLprLCdZfgo329ESizcaH

Solana

Lookalike-address dust transfers

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

Ethereum

Main holding and distribution wallet

0xa80fd27f9946e6235e21e8f0cdf9592624865246

Ethereum

First holding wallet

0x13b2809c6b3ad71024f624eabf857b59113462e3

Ethereum

Second holding wallet

0xf672434c9a5c67f4394b3a94842fb86102dd1926

Ethereum

Initial recipient of main swap

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

Ethereum

Distribution address before Aeroswap

0x28c741448db4429ca214b3e39a3b61f262b74d1c

Ethereum

First intermediary before Aeroswap

0x123b8f9781529ad3d173171a05937b263f9bebfc

Ethereum

Second intermediary before Aeroswap

0x1ba8c07afcc14856099186685724b218969d78f2

Ethereum

Third intermediary before Aeroswap

0x2cff890f0378a11913b6129b2e97417a2c302680

Ethereum

Shared payout address for both swaps

0xfb19ffd1ff9316b7f5bba076ef4b78e4bbedf4e1

Ethereum

Recipient of three payments; labeled Aeroswap

0xc09925a2ccfb801b45133d129d49a51e3b3c7548

Ethereum

Recipient of additional swap

0xcb8027c2c36239d0fb15ee2f8995b097ed79f1a1

Ethereum

Distribution address for additional swap

0x390f90dd7fe8665059869655cf757b9d52a7f1ac

Ethereum

Recipient of 0.54361855 ETH

0x41902261f16299c698b9e27a1569bfd27cf7d29b

Ethereum

Recipient of 0.13590463 ETH

0x5b8d2b4acbc8021f38f63ae67b6dd24b4dfca066

Ethereum

Recipient of mixed transfer of 0.136892175210883442 ETH

0x03547e71b1cd80b30e1c481913063d23386cbe45

Ethereum

Recipient of two small ETH transfers

0x56af94348f478cb6f8ed2c75273253547b32acd2

Ethereum

Commingling of the additional branch with other inflows

0xf1da42e4f7a3b7fd35ae541a9338577281d68b41

Ethereum

Recipient of 0.02625676 ETH

0xabee62571252c285a803987b3bdaa7b85fadc349

Ethereum

Intermediate address before RedotPay

0x9d7d8b567ee10bcb4f9db438245e1d0668175d72

Ethereum

Recipient of mixed outflow; labeled RedotPay

0xaf5ee32415cac2a5b611eb60169fa74a9e2e201c

Ethereum

Recipient of mixed outflow of 0.54522716 ETH

0x480cd46e6fade651a0437deadda53d5c8e7d846a

Ethereum

Service infrastructure per AML attribution

0x1584a8ee67789d1fe161065388657ad2f2a3c7dd

Ethereum

Actual sender of unrelated transaction E12

0x77eb52e44db06777bce478159f25c0d55a295314

Ethereum

Recipient of unrelated transaction E12

Appendix: Verified Transactions

Each row represents a confirmed transfer and links directly to a blockchain explorer. S denotes Solana; E denotes Ethereum. All times are UTC.

Code

UTC

Amount

Sender

Recipient

TXID

S01

2026-10-12 22:38:19

346.128159507 SOL

G9VPG4XvHheUUbzPexNzx9Yyx97ii53WYb89PvdM2qQk

B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR

qj9jzd…iHwqb

S02

2026-10-12 22:45:11

720,464.254644 USDC

Bj7syMSdLhR2WfVCwJtgYcqWghc5cHD9dnmu7ZsT9ica

7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C

5jGbny…qaGDn

S03

2026-10-12 22:58:50

718,735.798692 USDC

7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C

B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR

G4VQQU…f245k

S04

2026-10-12 23:24:47

1,720.192395 USDC

7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C

8gt7trRySj1Gzt3HtcsNVDe5UkT7BBPjQjHY62k371Qg

57VGrw…HsHacQ

S05

2026-10-12 23:25:09

6.605961 USDC

7jyHQUVw5cgUU1S1qjHK5ZLk2JzEwGoLJ9zgxPsBpf6C

8gt7trRySj1Gzt3HtcsNVDe5UkT7BBPjQjHY62k371Qg

meSeBz…wwF9Mw

S06

2026-10-12 23:26:51

1,725 USDC

8gt7trRySj1Gzt3HtcsNVDe5UkT7BBPjQjHY62k371Qg

7SxcLM1Ep56arSKTcB3CzHLtjyf51QgDua8cG8MwVmux

2Ynb1N…VijfDp6

E01

2026-10-12 23:27:35

0.698582915063641659 ETH

0x2cff890f0378a11913b6129b2e97417a2c302680

0xc09925a2ccfb801b45133d129d49a51e3b3c7548

0xab3962…29ade8

S07

2026-10-13 01:19:07

20 SOL

B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR

DWMDdqJUy9ywU3MVRcpZjehqfpSyTV6o3r9Rf2UQoXwf

4wKkcw…L3aNoy

S08

2026-10-13 01:20:28

326.126662056 SOL

B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR

DWMDdqJUy9ywU3MVRcpZjehqfpSyTV6o3r9Rf2UQoXwf

5Zxy7B…kJa4mgK

S09

2026-10-13 01:24:15

346.125169610 SOL

DWMDdqJUy9ywU3MVRcpZjehqfpSyTV6o3r9Rf2UQoXwf

vj83ppgFCvR1MJbopKzkJqZ7PFanmAEpE2aFVPVdQaH

4oAvhA…5Tm7Tun

E02

2026-10-13 01:24:59

14.700024849433303243 ETH

0x2cff890f0378a11913b6129b2e97417a2c302680

0xf672434c9a5c67f4394b3a94842fb86102dd1926

0x98d4f3…9df46b

S10

2026-10-13 01:41:08

718,735 USDC

B3pMs331kxjEjiB8rj6tyNsiGkLaXeKyPjJqTpBAarCR

DN2cCPNJnHjUxHwmNvfcKbhvcQnNQwvimugZLwDKMt2J

3GgFco…aCYWzd

S11

2026-10-13 02:16:10

718,735 USDC

DN2cCPNJnHjUxHwmNvfcKbhvcQnNQwvimugZLwDKMt2J

BfP2dBiHbiqYvsmESsgHEL8wQtZt25sbDNKnwmNRB34G

27Qb9B…bCMKEy

E03

2026-10-13 03:52:11

14.69997657 ETH

0xf672434c9a5c67f4394b3a94842fb86102dd1926

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

0xc2147e…49d94c

E04

2026-10-13 14:55:59

0.9382916 ETH

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

0xa80fd27f9946e6235e21e8f0cdf9592624865246

0xf3f72d…a4530

E05

2026-10-13 15:26:11

0.536467895376838892 ETH

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

0x13b2809c6b3ad71024f624eabf857b59113462e3

0xa55589…4ef44

E06

2026-10-13 15:54:59

0.39885608076037926 ETH

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

0xada81b…96d4c

E07

2026-10-13 15:59:35

0.19941639968254413 ETH

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

0x28c741448db4429ca214b3e39a3b61f262b74d1c

0x98ccdc…df1834

E08

2026-10-13 16:01:23

0.19940474378446023 ETH

0x28c741448db4429ca214b3e39a3b61f262b74d1c

0xfb19ffd1ff9316b7f5bba076ef4b78e4bbedf4e1

0x461eee…fcdcbe3

E09

2026-10-13 16:08:11

0.53109711358200486 ETH

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

0xce387a…35e017

E10

2026-10-13 16:11:23

0.73049655880165299 ETH

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

0x123b8f9781529ad3d173171a05937b263f9bebfc

0x5bbda5…5c505

E11

2026-10-13 16:12:47

0.730486058801652989 ETH

0x123b8f9781529ad3d173171a05937b263f9bebfc

0xfb19ffd1ff9316b7f5bba076ef4b78e4bbedf4e1

0x965642…a52c61

E12

2026-10-13 17:17:35

0 ETH (unrelated, spoofed sender)

0x1584a8ee67789d1fe161065388657ad2f2a3c7dd

0x77eb52e44db06777bce478159f25c0d55a295314

0xab94b0…b01b79

E13

2026-10-14 00:52:59

0.031822457352032674 ETH

0xabee62571252c285a803987b3bdaa7b85fadc349

0x9d7d8b567ee10bcb4f9db438245e1d0668175d72

0x4c8554…ea9d8c

E14

2026-10-14 22:39:59

0.03555563268538669 ETH

0xeec36e6b1dad28331e457d1abf532265d6ee700f

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

0x873335…40dbf

E15

2026-10-14 22:41:23

0.03554917222148869 ETH

0x2f254ef9acefeef89a382ba9a194f71c0888779e

0x1ba8c07afcc14856099186685724b218969d78f2

0x76b185…6b513a

E16

2026-10-14 22:42:47

0.035538672221488689 ETH

0x1ba8c07afcc14856099186685724b218969d78f2

0xfb19ffd1ff9316b7f5bba076ef4b78e4bbedf4e1

0x73aab9…f205e

Sources: the victim's public posts on X; Solana explorers and Etherscan; original NEAR Intents swap records; data collected on October 15, 2026.
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