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17.11.2026

Lighter Hack: BitOK Investigates $10.38M Theft and Traces Stolen Funds

On November 16, 2026, an attacker used a compromised API key to drain two trading accounts on decentralized exchange Lighter. Approximately $15.47 million was moved through the platform's liquidity pools, but only $10.38 million was successfully stolen. Another $5.09 million remained inside Lighter after the attacker failed to complete a second withdrawal.

BitOK analysts reconstructed the attack, traced the stolen funds across multiple blockchains and identified transactions used to prepare the operation four days earlier. The investigation reveals how the attacker bypassed wallet-signature requirements without compromising Lighter's smart contracts.
The investigation was conducted using BitOK’s Graph tool.


Contents:

  • What Happened to Lighter
  • How the Attacker Used an API Key to Steal Funds  
  • Two Accounts, Two Pools, One Attack Pattern  
  • Evidence of the Wallet-Signature Bypass  
  • The Lighter Attack: Minute-by-Minute Timeline  
  • When the Compromised Keys Were Disabled  
  • Why the Second $5.09 Million Withdrawal Failed  
  • How Much Did Lighter Actually Lose?  
  • Where the Stolen $10.38 Million Went  
  • BitOK Traced Attack Preparation to November 12  
  • How BitOK Linked the Attacker's Addresses  
  • What Remains Unknown  
  • What the Lighter Hack Reveals

What Happened to Lighter

On November 16, Lighter announced a security incident that appeared to involve a compromised external party.

The exchange immediately suspended withdrawals and pool creation while investigating the incident.

Less than two hours later, Lighter confirmed that the attack involved a leaked API key belonging to a trader. According to the exchange, its protocol and smart contracts were unaffected.

Lighter also announced several emergency measures:
  • Activated Guardian mode on its smart contract.
  • Initiated a contract upgrade under the supervision of the Lighter Security Council.
  • Prioritized recovering funds involved in an additional withdrawal attempt.
  • Kept withdrawals suspended, with plans to restore them by the end of November 16.
The exchange identified an Ethereum address believed to belong to the attacker:

0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387

BitOK's investigation confirmed that this address received the first successful withdrawal and subsequently distributed the funds through multiple services and networks.

How the Attacker Used an API Key to Steal Funds

Lighter is a perpetual futures exchange operating on its own Ethereum-based rollup. Its security model distinguishes between actions authorized by an API key and transfers requiring a signature from the owner's Ethereum wallet.

An API key can authorize trading, certain withdrawals, liquidity pool operations and transfers within the same master account. Moving funds to an unrelated account normally requires an additional signature from the owner's L1 wallet.

The attacker found a way around that restriction.

Rather than transferring funds directly between accounts, they used public liquidity pools as an intermediate destination.

The operation followed five steps:
  • Using the compromised API key, the attacker created a public pool associated with the victim's account.
  • The pool operator's stake was reduced to just 1,000 shares.
  • The attacker purchased 9,999,000 pool shares, acquiring 99.99% of the total.
  • The victim's available USDC balance was transferred into the pool.
  • The attacker burned their shares and redeemed the corresponding funds into their own Lighter account.
The critical detail is that a pool carries the same L1 owner address as the account that created it. Transfers into that pool therefore qualify as movements within the same master account and do not require a separate L1 wallet signature.

The attacker did not need the victims' Ethereum private keys. The compromised API credentials were sufficient to execute the pool-share scheme.

Two Accounts, Two Pools, One Attack Pattern

BitOK identified three accounts central to the operation.

Role

Lighter account

Pool ID

First victim

714710

281474976415757

Second victim

714723

281474976415701

Attacker

769455

—

The victim accounts were associated with the following Ethereum addresses:
  • 714710: 0x0d1d09312665d31ed68231b88079a245e0458f6f
  • 714723: 0x66cf2f85115cc20bf439720927c1f93de9672068
The attacker's account was associated with 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387.

Every unauthorized operation on the two victim accounts was signed using API key index #100.

Evidence of the Wallet-Signature Bypass

BitOK examined the signatures attached to the transfers.

The attacker-controlled transfers into the liquidity pools contained zeros in the L1 wallet-signature field.

By contrast, a legitimate transfer of 2.9 million USDC from account 714710 to another Lighter account on November 13 carried a valid wallet signature.

This difference matters. It demonstrates that the attacker used the API key to move funds through operations that did not require the owner's wallet authorization.

The compromised API keys were not newly registered immediately before the incident. Both accounts had used key #100 legitimately, and their last key changes through the Ethereum contract dated back to September 30.

On November 16, the owner of account 714710 used key #100 until 07:37 UTC, while the owner of account 714723 used it until 08:26 UTC.

BitOK also identified 393 operations signed with key #100 between the last recorded owner operation on account 714710 and the attacker's first pool creation. These operations do not appear in the account's public logs.

The available data does not establish how or when the attacker obtained the API credentials.

The Lighter Attack: Minute-by-Minute Timeline

BitOK reconstructed two nearly identical attack cycles between 09:40 and 10:28 UTC on November 16.

First Cycle: $10.38 Million Taken from Account 714710

The attacker began at 09:40:10 UTC by creating a pool associated with the first victim account.

Time (UTC)

Event

09:40–09:41

Public pool created; operator's stake reduced to 1,000 shares

09:41

Attacker buys 9,999,000 shares for 9,999 USDC

09:42–09:43

Twenty market orders close positions across 11 markets

09:44

A 1 USDC test transfer and test share redemption

09:45

Eleven transfers move approximately 10.38 million USDC into the pool

09:45

Attacker redeems shares for 10,392,825.88 USDC

09:46

Withdrawal of 10,393,056.79 USDC requested

The market orders generated approximately $12.40 million in trading volume as the attacker closed positions to free funds for transfer.

The main transfers consisted of ten payments of 1 million USDC and one payment of 383,864.27 USDC.

After the attacker redeemed their shares, the victim account recovered only 1,039.39 USDC from its remaining operator stake.

At 09:46:44 UTC, the attacker submitted a withdrawal request to Ethereum.

The request was later executed, allowing the stolen funds to leave Lighter.

Second Cycle: Another $5.09 Million Taken From Account 714723

The attacker repeated the scheme on the second account.

At 10:21 UTC, the main wallet had already returned 10,200 USDC to Lighter to finance another pool-share purchase.

Time (UTC)

Event

10:24

Eleven market orders close positions across eight markets

10:25–10:26

Second public pool created and operator's stake reduced

10:26

Attacker purchases 9,999,000 shares for 9,999 USDC

10:26

Another 1 USDC test transfer

10:27

Six transfers move approximately 5.09 million USDC into the pool

10:27

Attacker redeems shares for 5,096,387.02 USDC

10:28

Withdrawal of 5,096,588.02 USDC requested

The second round of position-closing trades generated approximately $8.81 million in trading volume.

Both cycles followed remarkably similar timing.

Transfers of 1 million USDC occurred every two to four seconds. Position-closing orders were submitted every two to six seconds.

Even the pauses between test transfers and the main series were nearly identical: 47.5 seconds in the first cycle and 48.2 seconds in the second.

These details strongly indicate that the attacker used the same automated script for both operations.

When the Compromised Keys Were Disabled

BitOK established that API key #100 was disabled on account 714710 at 10:21:02 UTC, after the first attack cycle.

On account 714723, the key was disabled at 10:45:45 UTC, after the second cycle had already finished.

The investigation also identified an unusual event shortly before the attack. At 09:38:47 UTC, the owner of account 714723 requested a legitimate withdrawal of approximately 2.40 million USDC to their own Ethereum address. Those funds arrived at 10:10 UTC.

The available data does not establish whether this withdrawal was related to awareness of the compromise.

Why the Second $5.09 Million Withdrawal Failed

Although the attacker successfully moved funds within Lighter during both cycles, only the first withdrawal reached Ethereum.

This difference is central to calculating the damage.

Lighter processes L1 withdrawals through rollup batches published and executed on Ethereum.

At 10:10:59 UTC, Lighter published batch 269191, containing the attacker's first withdrawal of 10,393,056.79 USDC.

At 10:11:47, the attacker claimed the funds from Lighter's Ethereum contract.

The transaction was processed as a regular withdrawal. BitOK found no evidence that the attacker bypassed the contract's Ethereum-level checks.

The second withdrawal followed a different path.

At 10:28:45 UTC, the attacker requested another 5,096,588.02 USDC. The request existed in Lighter's L2 transaction history, but it was never included in an Ethereum batch.

Lighter's last batch commitment was published at 10:32:11 UTC. However, it covered L2 operations only through 10:22:51 UTC, before the second pool was created.

No subsequent batches appeared before the investigation cutoff at 14:00 UTC.

BitOK found that:
  • The second withdrawal had not been executed on Ethereum.
  • The Lighter contract held no withdrawable balance credited to the attacker for that request.
  • Between 10:41 and 11:09 UTC, users attempted 96 forced withdrawals directly through the Ethereum contract. All reverted.
  • The contract's emergency exit mode remained disabled.
The second withdrawal could reach Ethereum only if Lighter subsequently published and executed a batch containing the request.

How Much Did Lighter Actually Lose?

BitOK calculated losses based on funds removed from the victim accounts through the pools, excluding amounts returned to their owners.

Metric

First account

Second account

USDC moved into pool

10,383,865.27

5,086,896.71

USDC returned to victim

1,039.39

509.69

Net funds taken

10,382,826.88

5,086,388.02

External withdrawal

Completed

Not completed

Across the two cycles, 15,470,761.98 USDC passed from the victim accounts into the malicious pools. After accounting for returned funds and minor adjustments, the attacker obtained 15,469,214.90 USDC in net value within Lighter.

However, approximately $5.09 million remained inside the exchange.

BitOK's preliminary realized-loss estimate is $10.38 million, representing the net victim funds from the first cycle that were successfully withdrawn and converted.

This estimate excludes trading fees and slippage caused by the market orders used to close positions. The full economic impact on the affected accounts could therefore differ.

Where the Stolen $10.38 Million Went

The attacker wasted little time after receiving the first withdrawal.

Between 10:13 and 10:46 UTC, they sold 10,383,182.63 USDC through CoW Protocol, receiving approximately 5,764.47 ETH.

The conversion took place in six orders:

Time (UTC)

USDC exchanged

10:13

1,000,000

10:14

2,000,000

10:15

5,000,000

10:16

2,000,000

10:17

360,000

10:46

23,182.63

According to BitOK's analysis, these orders were placed through the CoW Swap web interface rather than directly through an automated contract interaction.

The attacker then began distributing ETH to new addresses, preparing swaps and transfers across several networks.

Using BitOK Graph, analysts reconstructed the connections between the attacker's wallet, the funding addresses and the services used to move the proceeds.

Figure 1. Movement of stolen funds from Lighter, reconstructed using BitOK Graph. The visualization connects the attacker's Ethereum wallet with its funding sources, CoW Protocol swaps, twelve Wagyu-linked routes toward Monero, THORChain transfers toward Bitcoin and Solana, and a Tornado Cash deposit.

1,920 ETH Sent Through Wagyu for Monero

The largest identified series of outbound transfers involved Wagyu, a service facilitating cryptocurrency exchanges into Monero.

Beginning at 10:19 UTC, the attacker sent ETH to newly created addresses, generally in pairs of 160 ETH.

Over approximately two hours, twelve addresses received a combined 1,920 ETH.

BitOK found that these addresses behaved like Wagyu deposit addresses.

Each received transaction fees from the same service-associated wallet:

0xae06669dfd3e932476f00ea49fce82e5e63f83bf

The funds then moved through LI.FI and LayerSwap to Arbitrum, where they were converted into USDC and routed through Hyperliquid infrastructure.

The twelve addresses collectively received approximately 3.46 million USDC on Arbitrum and purchased 6,700.40 XMR1.

XMR1 represents Monero exposure on Hyperliquid. In this transaction pattern, the XMR1 stays in Wagyu's inventory while customers receive native Monero to their designated addresses.

This distinction is important for blockchain investigators.

The Ethereum and Arbitrum transactions remain visible, but the actual Monero recipient addresses are not available in public blockchain data.

Only Wagyu holds the information needed to identify those destinations.

Two Wagyu Transfers Returned to the Attacker

At 12:16 UTC, the attacker sent two additional payments of 160 ETH each to newly created addresses.

Unlike the previous twelve transfers, these funds were returned to the main wallet approximately twenty minutes later.

Both addresses received gas from the same Wagyu-associated wallet shortly before returning the ETH.

After these returns, the attacker stopped using Wagyu in the transaction sequence examined by BitOK and began routing funds through other services.

319.90 ETH Converted Toward Bitcoin

BitOK identified two swap requests through THORChain, a cross-chain liquidity protocol.

The first involved 159.90020288 ETH sent to a THORChain vault at 12:48 UTC.

At 13:18 UTC, the corresponding Bitcoin vault paid 4.45143972 BTC to:

bc1q7xwlly6j2re8zvg0tvx4wd8940q7486rdx5h6a

The Bitcoin transaction contained an OP_RETURN reference linking the payout to the incoming Ethereum transaction.

This provides evidence connecting the transfer across the two blockchains.

As of 14:00 UTC, the BTC had not moved from the receiving address.

A second request followed at 13:34 UTC, when the attacker's main wallet sent another 160.00020293 ETH.

THORChain scheduled a payout of 4.45532711 BTC to:

bc1qsq7p9ww76dq2q2v4x4qvz4lragwwq9ncwx02w0

That payout had not been sent by the investigation cutoff.

100 ETH Routed Toward Solana

Another branch involved a transfer of approximately 100 ETH to a THORChain vault at 12:36 UTC.

The requested output was approximately 2,530.53 SOL, designated for the Solana address:

6uNGcxvbtUKdoLztQeLaqg91pHhqSiJPvATHjDjaGFmp

According to the investigation, this swap was divided into 3,919 parts and expected to take approximately six hours.

As of 14:00 UTC, no Solana payout had arrived.

BitOK also found that three THORChain requests carried consecutive identifiers encoded in the fractional portions of their ETH amounts. This indicates that the same customer registered all three requests.

10 ETH Deposited into Tornado Cash

At 12:28 UTC, another attacker-linked address deposited 10 ETH into the 10 ETH pool of Tornado Cash.

The deposit came from:

0x1cde1ae1114c01ce42c099c927d65e92bb0218a1

The same address subsequently routed funds through THORChain toward Solana.

Unlike ordinary transfers, Tornado Cash deposits are designed to obscure the link between depositing and withdrawing addresses.

The investigation confirms the deposit into the pool but does not establish a subsequent withdrawal or final recipient.

Where the Stolen Funds Were at 14:00 UTC

BitOK recorded the following positions and transaction statuses at the investigation cutoff.

Destination

Amount

Status

Attacker's main Ethereum wallet

3,404.55 ETH

Still held

Lighter, second withdrawal

5,096,588.02 USDC

Not released to Ethereum

Wagyu, twelve ETH-to-XMR orders

1,920 ETH

Exchanged through Wagyu toward Monero

THORChain, Solana route

~2,530.53 SOL

Swap in progress

THORChain, first Bitcoin route

4.45143972 BTC

Received, unmoved

THORChain, second Bitcoin route

4.45532711 BTC

Payout scheduled

Tornado Cash

10 ETH

Deposited into pool

Secondary Ethereum address

9.9968 ETH

Still held

No stolen funds had been confirmed frozen in the investigated transactions by that cutoff.

The successfully withdrawn USDC had already been exchanged for ETH, substantially reducing the opportunity to intervene at the stablecoin level.

BitOK Traced Attack Preparation to November 12

The theft itself occurred on November 16, but the funding trail began four days earlier.

BitOK reconstructed an earlier sequence involving Wagyu, Monero-related payouts, Aevo, Across and several Ethereum addresses later connected to the attacker.

These transactions provided the gas and working capital required to operate the attacker's Lighter account.

November 12: Initial Funding Through Wagyu

Between 00:36 and 01:18 UTC on November 12, address

0x8ed04b14a24a9aa6cfd05595ff70953d25f73095

received three payouts through the Across bridge, totaling 14,994.42 USDC.

The funds originated from one-time addresses on Arbitrum supplied by infrastructure associated with Wagyu.

The address also received 0.137568 ETH for transaction fees through Mayan Swift.

Later that day, it forwarded approximately 15,014 USDC and 0.1265 ETH to another address:

0x67c72adcf158dcb84a12f7e8956c70c48af300c8

At 21:31 UTC, this address deposited 15,000 USDC into Aevo.

November 13: Funds Moved Through Aevo

On November 13, 975 USDC and 13,975 USDC were withdrawn from the Aevo account to a new Ethereum address:

0x61cd0c28f95cbd5b67597591f9df1a250a344cd8

BitOK linked these transfers to the earlier deposits using Aevo withdrawal proofs.

The proofs were signed by the original funding address, providing stronger evidence of a common operator than transaction timing alone.

The investigation also identified at least three attacker-linked addresses that deposited funds into Aevo.

November 16: Final Preparation Before the Attack

The activity accelerated on the morning of November 16.

Time (UTC)

Preparation activity

02:50–02:53

Several linked addresses execute small test transactions involving Aevo

06:02

Approximately 14,920 USDC sent into a Wagyu order for Monero

06:44

Main attacker wallet receives 0.02761 ETH for gas

06:47–06:49

Main wallet deposits a 29.96 USDC test amount into Lighter

08:45

Main wallet receives approximately 10,525.84 USDC through Across

09:00

Additional ETH arrives for gas

09:35–09:36

Attacker deposits 10,200 USDC into Lighter to finance the first malicious pool

09:40

First attack cycle begins

The 10,525.84 USDC received at 08:45 came through a Wagyu-associated payout route.

This is particularly significant because the attacker had sent preparation funds toward Monero earlier that morning.

However, public blockchain data does not establish that the incoming payout contained the exact same coins. Wagyu is the intermediary connecting these movements.

The pattern still demonstrates deliberate preparation, rather than an opportunistic withdrawal immediately after obtaining the API key.

How BitOK Linked the Attacker's Addresses

One of the investigation's most important findings concerns the attacker's transaction behavior.

BitOK analysts compared gas settings, transaction timing, test payments and execution patterns across the identified wallets.

A Repeated Gas Configuration

Transactions sent directly from several attacker-linked addresses shared the same validator priority fee of exactly 2 gwei.

The addresses also used a gas limit equal to 1.5 times the estimated consumption.

For example:
  • Ordinary ETH transfer: 31,500 gas limit.
  • USDC transfer: 94,635 gas limit.
  • Priority fee: exactly 2 gwei.
This combination appeared across the preparation and withdrawal infrastructure, including transactions from the main attacker wallet.

The 1.5 multiplier alone was not sufficient for attribution because Wagyu-associated addresses used similar settings. The consistent priority fee provided an additional distinguishing characteristic.

Nine Transactions with Unusual Fee Settings

BitOK uncovered another distinctive pattern between 02:50 and 02:53 UTC on November 16.

Nine transactions sent from four related addresses shared an unusual configuration:
  • Priority fee of 13,743 wei.
  • Maximum gas price equal to twice the current base fee.
  • Gas limit of 25,200.
These transactions were executed during the same short session.

Their matching parameters linked two additional addresses involved in small Aevo deposits to the previously identified preparation wallets.

The evidence supports the conclusion that these addresses were operated together.

Automated Attack, Manual Fund Swaps

The attacker did not use the same execution method for every stage.

On Lighter, operations were separated by just a few seconds, and the nearly identical timing of the two pool attacks indicates automated execution.

The CoW Protocol swaps showed different behavior.

BitOK determined that the orders were placed through CoW Swap's web interface, version 1.16.0. The first several orders were submitted roughly one minute apart, consistent with manual interaction.

The Tornado Cash deposit was also submitted through its interface, using a 3 gwei priority fee corresponding to the interface default.

These differences allowed BitOK to distinguish the operator's directly submitted transactions from operations generated by third-party services.

The attacker also repeatedly tested transactions before committing larger amounts. Examples include the 1 USDC pool transfers, small Aevo deposits and the 29.96 USDC test deposit to Lighter.

On November 16, the linked operator activity ran continuously from approximately 02:25 to 13:35 UTC.

This transaction-level evidence does not reveal the attacker's identity, but it provides a useful behavioral fingerprint for connecting the wallets.

What Remains Unknown

The investigation establishes how funds were moved and documents the transaction chain before and after the attack. Several questions nevertheless remain unresolved.

How the API key was compromised. Lighter attributed the incident to leaked credentials, but the available transaction data does not reveal how those credentials reached the attacker.

Who controlled the attacker accounts. On-chain behavior links multiple addresses, but it cannot independently establish the operator's real-world identity.

Where the Monero ultimately went. The Ethereum and Arbitrum legs are traceable. The native Monero payout addresses are not publicly visible and would require information from Wagyu.

What happened to the second withdrawal after 14:00 UTC. The funds remained within Lighter at the investigation cutoff. Their eventual disposition depends on subsequent actions and settlement activity.

Records held by Wagyu, Aevo and Lighter could provide additional evidence, including account activity, customer information, API-key histories and exchange sessions.

What the Lighter Hack Reveals

The Lighter attack is notable because the evidence does not point to a failure of the protocol's underlying smart contracts.

Instead, the attacker combined compromised API access with legitimate liquidity pool functionality. The pool structure enabled funds to move without the wallet signature normally required for transfers to another user.

The financial outcome was equally dependent on the platform's settlement process. The attacker successfully withdrew the proceeds of the first cycle, while the second request never reached Ethereum.

BitOK's investigation establishes that:
  • Approximately $10.38 million was successfully stolen, while another $5.09 million remained inside Lighter.
  • The attacker used liquidity pools and 99.99% share ownership to redirect funds from two compromised accounts.
  • The withdrawn USDC was rapidly exchanged for ETH and distributed through Wagyu, THORChain and Tornado Cash.
  • The funding infrastructure was active at least four days before the attack.
  • Matching transaction settings and execution patterns helped link the preparation wallets to the theft.
The case illustrates a broader security risk for crypto trading platforms: restricting direct withdrawals is not sufficient if other authorized operations can achieve an equivalent transfer of value.

For investigators, it also shows why tracing stolen cryptocurrency requires examining more than the final withdrawal. The preparation transactions, internal account operations, fee settings and cross-chain movements can collectively reveal how an attack was organized.

This article is based on BitOK's investigation of the Lighter incident. Financial figures, blockchain balances and transaction statuses reflect data available as of 14:00 UTC on November 16, 2026. Loss estimates are preliminary.
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