
What Happened to Lighter
How the Attacker Used an API Key to Steal Funds
Two Accounts, Two Pools, One Attack Pattern
Role | Lighter account | Pool ID |
First victim | 714710 | 281474976415757 |
Second victim | 714723 | 281474976415701 |
Attacker | 769455 | — |
Evidence of the Wallet-Signature Bypass
The Lighter Attack: Minute-by-Minute Timeline
First Cycle: $10.38 Million Taken from Account 714710
Time (UTC) | Event |
09:40–09:41 | Public pool created; operator's stake reduced to 1,000 shares |
09:41 | Attacker buys 9,999,000 shares for 9,999 USDC |
09:42–09:43 | Twenty market orders close positions across 11 markets |
09:44 | A 1 USDC test transfer and test share redemption |
09:45 | Eleven transfers move approximately 10.38 million USDC into the pool |
09:45 | Attacker redeems shares for 10,392,825.88 USDC |
09:46 | Withdrawal of 10,393,056.79 USDC requested |
Second Cycle: Another $5.09 Million Taken From Account 714723
Time (UTC) | Event |
10:24 | Eleven market orders close positions across eight markets |
10:25–10:26 | Second public pool created and operator's stake reduced |
10:26 | Attacker purchases 9,999,000 shares for 9,999 USDC |
10:26 | Another 1 USDC test transfer |
10:27 | Six transfers move approximately 5.09 million USDC into the pool |
10:27 | Attacker redeems shares for 5,096,387.02 USDC |
10:28 | Withdrawal of 5,096,588.02 USDC requested |
When the Compromised Keys Were Disabled
Why the Second $5.09 Million Withdrawal Failed
How Much Did Lighter Actually Lose?
Metric | First account | Second account |
USDC moved into pool | 10,383,865.27 | 5,086,896.71 |
USDC returned to victim | 1,039.39 | 509.69 |
Net funds taken | 10,382,826.88 | 5,086,388.02 |
External withdrawal | Completed | Not completed |
Where the Stolen $10.38 Million Went
Time (UTC) | USDC exchanged |
10:13 | 1,000,000 |
10:14 | 2,000,000 |
10:15 | 5,000,000 |
10:16 | 2,000,000 |
10:17 | 360,000 |
10:46 | 23,182.63 |
Figure 1. Movement of stolen funds from Lighter, reconstructed using BitOK Graph. The visualization connects the attacker's Ethereum wallet with its funding sources, CoW Protocol swaps, twelve Wagyu-linked routes toward Monero, THORChain transfers toward Bitcoin and Solana, and a Tornado Cash deposit.
1,920 ETH Sent Through Wagyu for Monero
Two Wagyu Transfers Returned to the Attacker
319.90 ETH Converted Toward Bitcoin
100 ETH Routed Toward Solana
10 ETH Deposited into Tornado Cash
Where the Stolen Funds Were at 14:00 UTC
Destination | Amount | Status |
Attacker's main Ethereum wallet | 3,404.55 ETH | Still held |
Lighter, second withdrawal | 5,096,588.02 USDC | Not released to Ethereum |
Wagyu, twelve ETH-to-XMR orders | 1,920 ETH | Exchanged through Wagyu toward Monero |
THORChain, Solana route | ~2,530.53 SOL | Swap in progress |
THORChain, first Bitcoin route | 4.45143972 BTC | Received, unmoved |
THORChain, second Bitcoin route | 4.45532711 BTC | Payout scheduled |
Tornado Cash | 10 ETH | Deposited into pool |
Secondary Ethereum address | 9.9968 ETH | Still held |
BitOK Traced Attack Preparation to November 12
November 12: Initial Funding Through Wagyu
November 13: Funds Moved Through Aevo
November 16: Final Preparation Before the Attack
Time (UTC) | Preparation activity |
02:50–02:53 | Several linked addresses execute small test transactions involving Aevo |
06:02 | Approximately 14,920 USDC sent into a Wagyu order for Monero |
06:44 | Main attacker wallet receives 0.02761 ETH for gas |
06:47–06:49 | Main wallet deposits a 29.96 USDC test amount into Lighter |
08:45 | Main wallet receives approximately 10,525.84 USDC through Across |
09:00 | Additional ETH arrives for gas |
09:35–09:36 | Attacker deposits 10,200 USDC into Lighter to finance the first malicious pool |
09:40 | First attack cycle begins |
How BitOK Linked the Attacker's Addresses
A Repeated Gas Configuration
Nine Transactions with Unusual Fee Settings
Automated Attack, Manual Fund Swaps
What Remains Unknown
What the Lighter Hack Reveals