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20.11.2026

GTA 6 Cryptocurrency: How Scammers Cash In on Investor Hype and How Much Money Investors Lost

Grand Theft Auto VI was released on November 19, 2026. Scammers are exploiting the excitement surrounding the game by launching cryptocurrencies that reference GTA 6, attracting investors and manipulating token markets for profit.

BitOK analysts investigated two schemes operating on Ethereum and Solana. In one, a token creator can remove coins from investors' wallets without their permission. In the other, an operator uses thousands of controlled wallets to manufacture demand by trading with itself.

On-chain evidence links the two schemes. Investors lost an estimated $4,746, while much larger amounts moved through the operator's network. As of November 20, when the investigation was completed, the operator was still launching new tokens.


Contents

  • Why GTA 6 attracts crypto scammers
  • GTA6DOG (RICO): a token with a hidden confiscation mechanism
  • Inside the Ethereum wallet network
  • Grand Theft Alleycat: manufactured demand on Solana
  • How the operator managed thousands of wallets
  • How BitOK linked the two schemes
  • Where the money went
  • How much investors lost
  • How to spot a fraudulent cryptocurrency
  • Key findings

Why GTA 6 attracts crypto scammers

Grand Theft Auto VI was one of the most anticipated game releases in years. Rockstar Games initially scheduled the game for May 26, 2026, before pushing the release back to November 19.

On that date, GTA VI officially launched for PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X|S.

Interest in the game had been building long before the GTA 6 release. Hundreds of crypto tokens appeared using GTA VI, GTA6, character references and other themes borrowed from the franchise.

The online conversation extends far beyond the launch itself. Gaming-related searches range from platform queries such as “ps5 gta 6” and “xbox gta 6” to “gta 6 lucia,” “mandy gta 6,” “fix railing gta 6,” and “how many chapters in gta 6.” These are searches about a game, not investment products. But the attention surrounding GTA 6 gives opportunistic token creators a recognizable name to exploit.

Almost anyone can create a cryptocurrency token. Doing so does not require permission from Rockstar Games: a developer can deploy a smart contract or use a token-launch platform.

Scammers borrow familiar names and imagery, hoping investors will buy into the hype and expect the price to rise. A token referencing GTA VI is not necessarily connected to Rockstar Games. None of the tokens examined in this investigation was an official Rockstar cryptocurrency.

BitOK focused on two cases:
  • GTA6DOG (RICO) on Ethereum, launched November 3, sixteen days before GTA VI's release.
  • Grand Theft Alleycat on Solana, where two tokens with the same name were launched November 19, the day the game came out.
At first glance, the projects had little in common. They operated on different blockchains and used different tactics. Following the funds, however, led BitOK analysts to a shared network of wallets.

GTA6DOG (RICO): a token with a hidden confiscation mechanism

The GTA6DOG token, ticker RICO, was deployed on Ethereum at 02:39:23 UTC on November 3, 2026.

Contract: 0x0cf2a91a067f57a6feb4d5533bda95851356e35e.

The deployer was 0xdce8418d60153bb1ad5450441ee0ba0014415997. Just 84 seconds earlier, the same address had created an identical copy of the token.

How the creator can take tokens from other wallets

RICO follows the ERC-20 standard used by many Ethereum tokens. Its published source code looks much like an ordinary smart contract.

But BitOK analysts found three small additions that fundamentally change how token transfers work.

Normally, ERC-20 holders control their own tokens. Another address generally needs an allowance before transferring tokens on the holder's behalf.

RICO makes an exception. When the contract is deployed, the creator's address is placed on a special, non-public list. When that address initiates a transfer from someone else's wallet, the contract skips the usual allowance check.

The creator can therefore take RICO from any holder without that person's approval or signature.

No function allows additional addresses to be added to the list. The privilege belongs exclusively to the creator.

An investor might never notice. The token appears in their wallet, can be bought through a liquidity pool and has a visible market price. Yet the creator retains the power to move it without the holder's consent.

How the creator made RICO appear safe

After deploying RICO, the creator deposited the entire supply of 1 billion tokens into a Uniswap v4 pool.

A liquidity pool holds the assets used for automated swaps. In this case, it allowed investors to exchange ETH for RICO.

About 90 seconds later, the creator sent the NFT representing their liquidity position to a burn address.

View the NFT transfer.

This can look reassuring. Burning the NFT for a liquidity position suggests that the creator can no longer withdraw that position in the normal way.

But RICO has a different vulnerability. The creator does not need to remove the pool's liquidity directly. They can forcibly transfer tokens out of investors' wallets and sell them back into the same pool.

Burning the liquidity-position NFT does not protect investors from privileged code inside the token contract.

How ten investors lost their tokens

Between November 3 and 5, the creator executed ten transactions that removed the entire RICO balances of ten investors. The tokens were forcibly sent to a burn address.

For example, at 13:08 UTC on November 3, 271,031 RICO were taken from 0x2f6c63efef0790e3cfb3f204055c9be8737992d6.

View the transaction.

The holder had not authorized the transfer.

On November 6, the creator went a step further. Using the same privileged mechanism, they recovered 9,236,467 RICO from the burn address, moved the tokens to their own wallet and sold them into the liquidity pool.

View the transfer of 9.2 million RICO.

In other words, sending RICO to a burn address did not make it inaccessible to the creator. The hidden transfer privilege overrode that expectation.

How much ETH the operator's wallets received

Three connected wallets sold RICO. ETH proceeds were directed to a shared address:

0x8e9ffadcaff79c7bb6f393617958c7f0d0267e26.

BitOK identified 14 sales totaling 24.03 ETH.

Wallet

Sales

ETH received

0xc0b2...436c4

8

18.0558 ETH

0xb5da...379a9

4

5.5097 ETH

0x6f299...42469

2

0.4624 ETH

The largest sale brought in 14.365 ETH.

View the largest sale.

The 24.03 ETH figure should not be confused with investors' losses or the scammer's net profit. It represents sales by connected wallets, including activity within the scheme itself.

Inside the Ethereum wallet network

RICO was only one part of a wider operation.

BitOK analysts identified central wallets through which the operator funded token deployers and sellers. The report calls these wallets hubs.

A hub collects funds, distributes them to other wallets and receives proceeds from their activity.

Why the operator used one-time contracts

The operator did not rely solely on direct ETH transfers.

A hub would create a temporary smart contract, fund it with ETH and instruct it to distribute the money to selected wallets. The contract would then self-destruct.

As a result, the sender shown in a recipient's ordinary transaction history could appear to be an empty address.

This makes a quick review in a blockchain explorer less informative. But Ethereum's internal transaction data still allows analysts to trace the funds back to their source.

The operator used this method to fund wallets collecting and selling RICO.

From November 3 to 19, one hub transferred 231.41 ETH to another in 20 transactions. The two largest transfers, 50 ETH each, occurred on November 8 and 9.

A separate central wallet became active on November 2 and received 202.57 ETH from an earlier hub in the network.

Where the launch funding came from

Some of the ETH used to pay transaction fees originated from centralized exchanges.

On November 2, the RICO deployer received 0.33106665 ETH in a withdrawal from Coinbase.

View the Coinbase-linked transaction.

On November 5, a second connected deployer received a nearly identical amount, 0.33117657 ETH, from Kraken.

On November 6, that address launched another token, Rocco, and received 299 USDC from the RICO creator. The following day, both deployers sent their remaining ETH to the same hub.

The two addresses also used a shared payment address for DEXT token transactions. Together, these details helped BitOK connect their activity.

Withdrawals from Coinbase or Kraken do not suggest that either exchange participated in the fraud. In this investigation, those transactions establish funding sources for the wallets involved.

Three more tokens with the same trap

BitOK found the same privileged-transfer code in three other Ethereum contracts that referenced GTA VI.

Token

Launch date

Contract

GTA VI ($GTA6)

November 1

0xa258...a2e5

Grand Theft Auto VI

November 4

0x286e...2007

Grand Theft Auto VI ($GTA6)

November 4

0x684a...a51

Each deployer received exactly 0.5 ETH through a one-time contract and returned the unused balance to a common hub.

On November 15, this hub received 0.5 ETH directly from the RICO network. Another major source had transferred it 210.58 ETH.

These links point to a coordinated series of token launches, not simply unrelated contracts with similar code.

The RICO wallet network on Ethereum

Figure 1. The RICO creators, other GTA VI-themed token deployers, investors, sellers and three central hubs. The transaction graph was produced using BitOK Graph.

The graph traces ETH funding from Coinbase and Kraken into the wider network. It also shows the Uniswap pool, one-time contracts and the wallets used to sell tokens.

Together, these connections reveal how the launches were funded and where the sales proceeds went.

Grand Theft Alleycat: manufactured demand on Solana

On November 19, the day GTA VI launched, the operator created two Grand Theft Alleycat tokens on Solana.

Both were deployed by:

EGGuvXireJ5CVbpBpkAFNFeo3x9yBG16P6ztQGcrYP9n

The first appeared at 05:22:01 UTC; the second followed at 05:32:54 UTC.

Their token addresses are:
This time, the operator relied on a different tactic: rather than confiscating tokens through privileged contract code, the scheme manufactured the appearance of widespread demand.

How a pump.fun launch works

Grand Theft Alleycat was launched on pump.fun.

New tokens on the platform initially trade against an automated pricing mechanism known as a bonding curve. As buying activity increases, the price rises. Once the initial stage is completed, the token migrates to a PumpSwap liquidity pool, where it can trade freely.

A rapid migration may look like evidence that a new token has attracted genuine interest. But with Grand Theft Alleycat, the operator controlled much of the early buying.

In the first seconds after each launch, connected wallets bought up the initial supply.

The transaction creating the second token had six signers: the creator, the token address and four buyer wallets. Another 14 wallets completed the bonding-curve purchases, with each transaction signed by seven wallets.

In total, 19 connected addresses bought out the initial stage for approximately 85.6 SOL. In the same Solana slot, the token reached PumpSwap with 85.55 SOL of liquidity.

From the outside, the launch appeared successful: the tokens sold quickly, early trades appeared and a trading pool opened. Yet the signature data showed that the earliest buyers were coordinating their actions.

Where the buyer wallets got their SOL

The connected wallets received SOL from centralized services to cover network fees.

On November 16, the Alleycat creator received 0.194 SOL from a SideShift hot wallet.

Several operator-controlled wallets received identical 0.196841 SOL payments as part of one batch transfer from Bitget.

The matching amounts and shared funding source helped BitOK identify wallets involved in the launch.

Thousands of wallets created the illusion of demand

During the first hour of trading in the second Grand Theft Alleycat token, 6,495 wallets participated. Purchases totaled 3,903 SOL.

Those numbers could suggest extraordinary interest in a new token. But BitOK traced where the money had come from.

The investigation found that 1,265 wallets received SOL from the same address before making their first purchase:

HhGfjp31QKATkJmgQz8Gna6Hb2NsVKwHSShJqe6BvoSq.

That address was the operator's central hub.

The funded wallets purchased 3,454.8 SOL worth of Alleycat and did not sell any tokens during the first hour. Five additional wallets making the earliest pool trades were also connected to the operator.

BitOK compared buying and selling activity across four groups:

Wallet group

Bought, SOL

Sold, SOL

Net, SOL

19 launch wallets

86.1

3,202.8

+3,116.7

5 other operator wallets

161.0

33.6

-127.4

1,265 wallets funded by the hub

3,454.8

0

-3,454.8

5,206 wallets not linked to the operator

201.4

151.2

-50.2

Results for the first hour of trading in the second token.

Most of the apparent trading activity came from wallets connected to the operator.

The launch wallets sold tokens for SOL. Other wallets in the same network bought those tokens, making the market appear far more active than it was among independent investors.

In effect, the operator was selling the token to itself.

Independent investors also traded. During that first hour, they spent 201.4 SOL on the second token but received only 151.2 SOL from sales: a negative net result of approximately 50.2 SOL.

The first Grand Theft Alleycat token followed a similar pattern. Here, 105 hub-funded wallets bought 268.4 SOL worth of tokens, while 52 unconnected wallets recorded losses of around 4.5 SOL in the first hour.

The visible trading volume was therefore far greater than the demand generated by independent investors.

How the operator bought tokens from itself

Figure 2. How connected wallets manufactured demand for Grand Theft Alleycat on Solana. Diagram prepared by BitOK analysts from the investigation, which used BitOK Graph.

The diagram shows 1,265 operator-controlled wallets buying 3,454.8 SOL worth of tokens while 19 launch wallets sold 3,202.8 SOL worth.

The proceeds flowed back into a shared hub and then into the operator's treasury. Purchases by independent investors are shown separately; this group had a negative result in the first hour.

How the operator managed thousands of wallets

Keeping such a scheme running requires more than wallets that buy and sell tokens. The operator must also fund those wallets and collect the proceeds.

BitOK traced how the network handled these transfers.

Temporary WSOL accounts instead of direct transfers

After selling Alleycat, the launch wallets returned their SOL proceeds to the central hub. But they did not always use ordinary SOL transfers.

Instead, they used temporary Wrapped SOL (WSOL) accounts. WSOL is a tokenized form of SOL used by token programs on Solana.

After a sale, a wallet would:
  • Open a temporary WSOL account.
  • Move its available balance into that account.
  • Close the account, directing the returned SOL to the operator's hub.
All three actions took place within a single transaction, usually only seconds after the sale.

For example, at 05:51:21 UTC on November 19, one wallet transferred 29.81 SOL to the hub in this way.

View the Solana transaction.

Such movements may be less obvious in a wallet's basic transaction history. The funds do not disappear, however: analysts can reconstruct the route from the transaction's execution details.

More than 53,000 transactions in four days

Between 05:31 UTC on November 19 and 03:00 UTC on November 20, the 19 launch wallets sent a total of 8,705.35 SOL to the shared hub in 963 transfers.

The hub became active on November 16. By November 20, BitOK had identified:
  • 53,628 transactions.
  • 23,221.6 SOL sent to 4,677 wallets.
  • Return transfers from 4,647 of those wallets.
  • 10,795.5 SOL transferred to the operator's treasury.
The treasury is a separate wallet used to collect money and fund new hubs.

It had been active since October 31. By November 20, approximately 155,000 SOL had passed through it.

Because funds moved repeatedly between connected wallets, that figure represents transaction flow, not profit. The treasury held 3,856.24 SOL as of November 20.

New cryptocurrencies after the GTA VI launch

The operator was still launching tokens when BitOK completed its investigation.

On November 20, the same keys used to create Grand Theft Alleycat were involved in launching two more cryptocurrencies:

Token

Launch time (UTC)

Proceeds to launch wallets

Anthropic Cat Brian

00:45

1,939.68 SOL

iCat

04:24

1,273.65 SOL

The activity was not limited to tokens referencing GTA 6. The names changed, but the operator continued using the same wallets and trading methods.

How BitOK linked the two fraud schemes

RICO operated on Ethereum; Grand Theft Alleycat ran on Solana. Their names and methods were different.

Yet BitOK analysts uncovered direct financial links between wallets in the two networks.

Transfers through the Mayan bridge

Some money reached Solana through Mayan, a cross-chain bridge.

A cross-chain bridge lets users move value between blockchains. For instance, someone can deposit ETH on Ethereum and receive SOL at a Solana address.

BitOK identified several such transfers:

Date

Assets sent

Received on Solana

October 19

32 ETH

734.24 SOL

November 3

7 BNB and 2 ETH

101.67 SOL

November 4-13

9.65 ETH

237.66 SOL

In the first two cases, the assets initially reached intermediary wallets. On October 31, those wallets sent 776.84 SOL and 1,254.3 SOL to the operator's treasury.

Each substantial transfer was preceded by a small test transaction, for 3 SOL and 10 SOL respectively.

First chain of transfers

On October 27, an earlier RICO hub sent 10 ETH to:

0x6fd896486987153b7e6154acd63420c3f6d443f6.

On November 9, that same wallet received 64.2 ETH from an address that had also been funding the Solana treasury through Mayan.

View the 64.2 ETH transaction.

This intermediary wallet was therefore financially connected both to the RICO network and to an address sending funds to Solana.

Second chain of transfers

On October 19, another wallet moved 32 ETH through Mayan and received 734.24 SOL on Solana.

Six hours earlier, it had sent 15 ETH to a different Ethereum wallet.

That wallet subsequently transferred 131.94 ETH to a source funding one of the RICO hubs. It also exchanged substantial sums with the earlier hub: 55 ETH went in one direction and 25 ETH came back.

This provided a second, independent connection between the networks.

The same transaction pattern

BitOK also noticed a recurring pattern in the operator's transfers.

On Ethereum, large payments were often preceded by a 0.1 ETH test transaction, followed by the main amount roughly a minute later. A similar pattern appeared on Solana.

Test payments are not evidence of fraud by themselves. But combined with direct financial links, common hubs and matching funding methods, they reinforced BitOK's conclusion.

The evidence indicates that one operator controlled both RICO and Grand Theft Alleycat.

How the Ethereum and Solana wallets were connected

Figure 3. Two chains of transfers linking RICO on Ethereum with Grand Theft Alleycat on Solana via Mayan, including transfers to HitBTC. Diagram prepared by BitOK analysts from an investigation using BitOK Graph.

The diagram follows the transfers connecting the RICO hubs with wallets that funded the Solana treasury. Together, these routes show how funds moved between chains and which addresses tied the two operations together.

Where the money went

Part of the linked network's funds was deposited on the cryptocurrency exchange HitBTC.

BitOK identified the following wallet:

0x51642424f3839af2b369aa3f87494e38841f5a2c.

It received 20 ETH from a connected address on October 27, followed by another 30 ETH from a different network wallet on October 29.

The funds were subsequently distributed across five HitBTC deposit addresses:

Date

Sent to HitBTC

October 27-28

10 ETH

October 29

10 ETH

October 29

10 ETH

October 29

10 ETH

October 31

1.99 ETH

Total

41.99 ETH

HitBTC subsequently consolidated the deposits into its hot wallet. Three of them were swept at virtually the same time, at 14:30:59 UTC on October 29.

Another 10 ETH passed through an intermediary wallet to Union Chain on October 27.

In total, 51.99 ETH reached HitBTC and Union Chain between October 27 and 31.

The timing matters. These transfers predated both RICO and Grand Theft Alleycat. They cannot be described as proven profits from those two November token launches.

What they do show is that the linked wallet network was active before the GTA VI-themed tokens appeared.

Once funds enter a centralized exchange, subsequent activity may occur within its internal accounting system. Public blockchain data alone cannot establish who ultimately received the money.

How much investors lost

To calculate losses, BitOK separated operator-controlled wallets from investors who put in their own money.

This distinction is particularly important for Grand Theft Alleycat, where much of the trading volume came from wallets linked to the token creator.

Cryptocurrency

Investor losses

USD equivalent

GTA6DOG (RICO)

0.20417 ETH and 260.09 USDT/USDC

$720

Grand Theft Alleycat

54.74 SOL

$4,026

Total

 

$4,746

With RICO, ten investors lost their entire token balances after the creator forcibly transferred the coins away.

For Grand Theft Alleycat, BitOK examined the first hour of trading in each of the two tokens. Wallets controlled by the operator were excluded.

The losses were converted into US dollars using prices on the relevant dates:
  • ETH: $2,250 on November 3, 2026.
  • SOL: $73.56 on November 19, 2026.
The Solana calculations also account for network fees.

BitOK estimates that investors lost approximately $4,746 across the cases examined.

That is not the network's total trading volume, nor is it the operator's established profit. It is the loss BitOK could identify from the transactions reviewed.

The figure may not capture the full consequences of the scheme, including potential losses involving tokens launched after Grand Theft Alleycat.

How to spot a fraudulent cryptocurrency

RICO and Grand Theft Alleycat illustrate how differently crypto scams can operate.

RICO had published source code and liquidity on Uniswap. Grand Theft Alleycat had thousands of trading wallets and substantial volume. None of those signals, on its own, guaranteed safety.

1. The creator can control investors' tokens. A contract may contain hidden functions that let its developer move coins without the holder's approval, block wallets or prevent selling.

2. Many buyers receive funds from the same wallet. That can be a sign of manufactured demand: a single operator funds multiple addresses to buy its own token.

3. Wallets act in lockstep. Identical funding amounts, purchases seconds after launch and a shared destination for proceeds may indicate coordinated activity.

4. Multiple tokens share the same contract code. Scammers can change a token's name while keeping risky functions and withdrawal mechanisms intact.

5. Sale proceeds converge on common addresses. When different sellers repeatedly send funds to the same wallet, it is worth checking whether those sellers are connected.

6. The name references a popular game or brand. That does not establish any official relationship. A token named after GTA VI may have no connection whatsoever to Rockstar Games.

Before buying an unfamiliar cryptocurrency, it is not enough to look at price and trading volume. The contract, funding sources, transaction history and connections between wallets all matter.

BitOK Graph lets investigators visualize transfers between addresses, identify related wallets and trace the movement of funds. This kind of analysis helped BitOK connect RICO and Grand Theft Alleycat.

Key findings from the BitOK investigation

Scammers exploit the popularity of GTA VI to attract investors to cryptocurrencies that can look like ordinary speculative tokens.

BitOK analysts examined two projects and identified different forms of abuse.

On Ethereum, the RICO creator inserted a privileged function into the contract that allowed tokens to be taken without their owners' permission. Between November 3 and 5, the operator removed coins from ten investors' wallets.

On Solana, the operator manufactured demand for Grand Theft Alleycat. Thousands of wallets bought the token, but much of the money came from addresses tied to the operator itself.

Following the transfers revealed common wallets and connections through the Mayan bridge.

Investors lost approximately $4,746. Much larger amounts circulated through the operator's network, but those flows cannot be treated as investor losses or net criminal proceeds.

As of November 20, 2026, the operator was still launching new cryptocurrencies. The names changed; the wallets and trading methods remained the same.

The investigation shows why high trading volume and thousands of apparent buyers do not necessarily signal genuine interest. Scammers can manufacture those metrics themselves.

Before investing, it is essential to understand not only what a token costs, but also who created it, where the buyers' funds come from and who receives the sale proceeds.
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