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14.11.2025

The largest Tether freeze of 2025


On 31 October 2025, Tether executed one of its largest address-freezing actions of the year, blocking more than $45 million in USDT. Over 15 Ethereum addresses associated with large-scale fraud were added to Tether’s blacklist. Based on our on-chain analysis, the total value of frozen assets exceeds $45 million — roughly double the volume targeted in the previous major freeze involving addresses linked to the sanctioned exchange Garantex.

Dynamics and Context

26.1 million USDT — the largest amount of cryptocurrency among all the blocked addresses on October 31 was held at the wallet 0xf3bFC88B752cFC435FCDa87fb4119E80dADbA3eB.

Our research shows that initially these wallets were credited by illicit funds from addresses at centralized exchanges. Exchanges disclose information about transactions and clients only upon a request from law enforcement. Therefore we assume that the freezing operation was carried out in cooperation with law enforcement agencies and exchanges.
26.1 million USDT — the largest amount of cryptocurrency among all the blocked addresses on October 31 was held at the wallet

0xf3bFC88B752cFC435FCDa87
fb4119E80dADbA3eB.

Our research shows that initially these wallets were credited by illicit funds from addresses at centralized exchanges. Exchanges disclose information about transactions and clients only upon a request from law enforcement. Therefore we assume that the freezing operation was carried out in cooperation with law enforcement agencies and exchanges.
Illustration 1. Here Graph revealed all scam transactions performed to and from the addresses frozen on October 31

Transaction Typologies and Red Flags

BitOK team detected a typical pattern used by this group to conceal the origin of stolen cryptocurrency.

The transaction flow is consistent with a standard ‘accumulate, layer, integrate' laundering pattern, representing one of the most prevalent money laundering methodologies seen in crypto markets today.

1. Accumulation or Consolidation Addresses

A set of wallets functioned as consolidation points for incoming funds from multiple victims and accomplices.

Example: 0x6d2d7e732a7bc43f311016fbba08a247c89abf27 accumulated cryptoassets from numerous upstream addresses over periods ranging from a single day to a month, before forwarding the entire balance in a single, high-value transfer to another address.

This behavior is consistent with fund consolidation ahead of the layering phase.
A set of wallets functioned as consolidation points for incoming funds from multiple victims and accomplices.

Example:
0x6d2d7e732a7bc43f311016fbba08
a247c89abf27
accumulated cryptoassets from numerous upstream addresses over periods ranging from a single day to a month, before forwarding the entire balance in a single, high-value transfer to another address.

This behavior is consistent with fund consolidation ahead of the layering phase.
Illustration 2: The process of accumulating and distributing cryptocurrencies via the address 0x6d2d7e732a7bc43f311016fbba08a247c89abf27

2. Transit (Layering) Addresses

From the accumulation wallets, funds were routed to intermediate "transit" addresses, used primarily for layering and further obscuring the trail.

Example: 0x5dd1a12a9f9aaf19ed277c9fe177924e3b2cd344 received funds from attacker-controlled addresses and then forwarded them to additional wallets, forming a network of short-lived, low-purpose addresses — a key transaction monitoring red flag.
Illustration 3: Through the address 0x5dd1a12a9f9aaf19ed277c9fe177924e3b2cd344, cryptocurrency assets were routed to multiple addresses to obscure their origin and facilitate subsequent withdrawal

3. Multi-Stage Transfers and Circular Flows

To complicate the identification of the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), portions of the funds were moved through secondary and tertiary addresses, sometimes in circular patterns:
  • Funds were sent from the originating address to second-level wallets
  • Then onward to third-level wallets
  • Shortly afterward, assets were sent back from the third-level wallets to the second-level ones
This creates additional layers of on-chain "noise", designed to hinder blockchain analytics, and is typical of complex layering schemes.
Illustration 4: The address 0x3f529577d4a5097d9a9a3713b65cd321fc473e7e receives assets from 0x85e5420da19bfeb30323179b7cb40cea3d2f033d and, to obscure the transaction trail, transfers them to 0x51a8aaa917699faf764bc7af25dbec3493080013, which also receives funds from 0x85e5420da19bfeb30323179b7cb40cea3d2f033d

4. Off-Ramping via Centralized Exchanges

At the final stage, USDT was sent to deposit addresses of major centralized exchanges, where the perpetrators could cash out, convert, or further redistribute the funds.

Our analysis identified transfers to exchange-controlled wallets associated with Binance, Kraken, HTX (Huobi), KuCoin, OKX, WhiteBIT.

These platforms represent key off-ramp points, where robust AML/KYC controls and suspicious activity reporting (SAR/STR) mechanisms are essential.

In this specific case, partial flows of stolen funds were successfully traced to WhiteBIT, Binance, HTX, among others. The pattern of alternating "accumulation → transit → exchange" phases closely mirrors known fraud and laundering typologies already documented in relation to organized criminal groups.
Illustration 5: After passing through a series of transactions, the funds are transferred to cryptocurrency exchange addresses, including those of Binance

Fraud Typology: Pseudo-Investment / "Pig Butchering" Scheme

The underlying predicate offense appears consistent with a pseudo-investment fraud often overlapping with so-called “pig butchering” romance/investment scams:
1. Social engineering and misrepresentation.
Fraudsters present themselves as “professional traders” or “portfolio managers” and persuade victims to transfer significant amounts of cryptocurrency for alleged high-yield trading strategies.

2. Fabricated performance and false reporting.
Over a period of time, victims are shown fake trading dashboards, screenshots, or even staged videos that simulate successful trades and growing balances.

3. Exit or secondary extortion.
Ultimately, the perpetrators either:
  • Disappear with all funds (exit scam), or

  • Claim that the victim’s assets are "frozen" or "under review", and demand additional "unlock fees", "tax payments" or "security deposits" to a so-called "safe account"—which is, in fact, another address under the scammers' control.
Blockchain security experts note a sharp increase in reported cases of this typology, making it a key fraud risk for compliance teams to monitor.

Scale of the Threat and Enforcement Gaps

Illustration 6: Similar case investigated by BitOK team
Although the recent freeze of approximately $ 45 million in USDT is a significant enforcement milestone, it represents only a small fraction of the overall volume associated with fraudulent activity in the virtual asset ecosystem. In the other investigation conducted by our analysts (referenced in the transaction flow diagram Illustration 6), we identified an estimated $ 150 million in illicit proceeds. Of this amount, roughly $ 83 million was traced through the mapped wallet cluster, and only about $ 24 million was ultimately frozen. This discrepancy underscores a broader reality: the true scale of misappropriated funds is substantially higher, and a considerable portion cannot be intercepted in time.

Effectively mitigating these threats requires tightly coordinated action between industry participants, blockchain analytics providers, and law enforcement agencies. Since the launch of USDT in 2014, Tether has frozen in excess of $ 1.5 billion in assets linked to suspected illicit activity. Yet, despite these measures, the prevalence and sophistication of crypto-related fraud schemes continue to grow. A notable example is the November 2023 case, in which Tether voluntarily froze approximately $ 225 million in USDT connected to a large-scale international "romance" investment-phishing operation employing the so-called "pig butchering" tactic in Southeast Asia.

The October 31 enforcement action dealt with an extensive scam network, disrupting fraudulent flows and constraining the perpetrators' liquidity. However, the campaign against such schemes is ongoing. The wider industry is intensifying efforts to identify, trace, and disrupt fraud typologies at an earlier stage, enhance preventive and detection controls, and deepen operational cooperation with law enforcement to more effectively combat cryptocurrency-enabled financial crime.
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